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Abstract
According to recent literature on growth and development differences in levels of economic success
across countries are driven primarily by institutions that frame the economic environment in which
people produce and interact. This paper suggests a method to measure institutions. We use a form of
cluster analysis to discover relationships between elements of institutions (individual indicators),
resulting in new (latent) variables which we try to interpret as "real" institutions. The method is applied
to a dataset consisting of more than 100 institutional indicators for 20 OECD countries, which are
potentially important to explain differences across these countries. We reduce this information to a
restricted number of clusters. These institutions are used to classify countries. Thereafter, we relate our
institutions to two measures of economic success: productivity and structural unemployment. Overall,
despite the crudity of the indicators at our disposal, we do appear to be able to associate a great part
of the cross-country variance in economic success with institutional differences between countries.
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1 Introduction- 2 -
It has been widely observed that changes in transport and communication technologies have enhanced
the ease with which people and goods cross national borders. Production is now set up on a modular
basis, whereby production of the modules is often spread out across the globe, depending on the
comparative advantages of the regions. As a result many corporations now function within a global
network, which has resulted in new forms of internationalization, the so-called intra-firm trade. New
technologies such as flexible manufacuturing (a combination of just-in-time production and
information technology) in many ways facilitated this process. In some sectors, trends towards product
differentiation provided opportunities for small, flexible and innovative companies, making market
structures even more competitive. Internationalization implies a reduction in the effectiveness of
traditional monetary and budgetary policies, as a result of ’leakage’ effects in a globalized world
economy. But the power of national states may regain some of their lost capacity to act by refocusing
economic policies on the elements of institutions, especially those factors which are largely immobile
between countries.
Many policies promoted by the IMF and the World Bank, such as deregulation, privatization,
and stable business environments, are implicitly based on the assumption that these policies will create
incentives for entrepreneurs to develop new businesses, adopt new technologies, and the like. Those
investments by entrepreneurs create a type of capital, that can be called business capital (cf. Schmitz,
1993). A significant aspect of business capital is that it is often specific to a region. For example, to
introduce a new product in an area, an entrepreneur must make adjustments to suit local tastes; to
introduce a new technology, the entrepreneur must make the process suitable to local skills. What
matters is the interactions between institutions and strategic behaviour. To understand differences in
levels of economic success across countries we have to understand differences in institutions that
frame the economic environment in which people produce and interact. The project of this paper
extends previous empirical work on growth and development by trying to identify the constituent
factors of institutions.
The contribution of this paper is empirical. Current empirical research on long-run economic
performance is mainly restricted to single equation tests of macroeconomic growth models based on
large cross-country samples. However, these studies all face substantial problems in estimating and
interpreting growth regressions (cf. Temple, 1999). Moreover, growth regressions fail to explore the
opportunity of multidisciplinary research. As already noted by Knack and Keefer (1995), institutional
indicators are conspicuously absent in empirical research on growth and productivity. Hence, according
to Temple (1999), one promising approach to breathe new life into growth empirics: "...is to model
social and political influences on growth as latent variables related to a variety of observable indica-
tors." This is the mode of research we have chosen here.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Starting point is the analysis of Nickell and Layard (1997)
for 20 OECD countries relating unemployment and productivity on a set of labour market indicators.
One reason for focussing on this restricted number of countries is that we want to build our analysis
on a recent and well-known study, relating individual indicators of institutions to productivity and
unemployment. Another reason is that the OECD countries are likely to fall on a common surface, so- 3 -
that some econometric problems in growth empirics (cf. Fagerberg (1994), Mankiw (1995) and Temple
(1999)) might be avoided. We extend the dataset of Nickell and Layard by a large number of institu-
tional indicators. Subsequently, we use a form of cluster analysis to discover relationships between
individual indicators. The clusters are used to classify countries. We conclude by relating our institu-
tions to cross-country differences in productivity and structural unemployment.
2 Data
2.1 Product Market Indicators
In this paper over 100 indicators are reduced to less than 20 clusters. The set of indicators is described
in the Data Appendix. The greater part of the data used in this paper comes from the World
Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY). The WCY measures how national environments sustain the
domestic and global competitiveness of the firms that operate in the countries covered. The WCY uses
two types of data: hard data and soft data. Hard data are statistical indicators obtained from
international and regional organisations, private institutions and national institutes. Soft data are
compiled by the Executive Opinion Survey. The WCY asks a number of top and middle managers to
evaluate the present and future competitiveness for the country in which they operate. There are, of
course, limitations to survey data. The questions asked are more vague than what ideally an economist
would like to use. However, our focus is on long-run determinants that are likely to change slowly over
time. That is why we do not draw upon the time series dimension of the WCY panel. Instead we use
a large number of individual indicators to ensure that the resulting clusters are robust with respect to
subjective elements. We also have chosen to focus on the results of the surveys in the first half of the
1990s. In this period the advanced countries returned to the long-run pattern of investment and growth,
which started around 1870 (cf. Van de Klundert and Van Schaik, 1996). Deviations were the period
including World War II and the process of catching up vis à vis the US economy in the 1950s and in
the 1960s. High inflation and high turbulence in the 1970s and 1980s was the price for this exceptional
golden era of economic growth in Western Europe. Presumably, the results of surveys in the 1990s are
more representative for stable long-run expectations about the fundamentals of the economy than the
results of surveys in the 1980s. The relatively steady development of most OECD economies in the
second half of the 1990s supports this line of thought.
2.2 Labour Market Indicators
Labour market indicators are borrowed from Nickell and Layard (1997). In a series of papers, Nickell
and Layard (1997) and Nickell (1997, 1998) have investigated the relationship between unemployment
and labour market institutions across 20 OECD countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the UK, Canada, the US, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.- 4 -
Nickell and Layard present regressions based on two cross-sections dated 1983-88 and 1989-
94. The dependent variables are the unemployment rates (total, long-term and short-term). The set of
independent variables is a collection of labour market indicators. Direct indicators of labour market
rigidity are employment protection, an index measuring the extent of employment protection and
labour standards, an index measuring the strength of legislation governing several aspects of the labour
market, including working time, fixed-term contracts, employment protection, minimum wages and
employees’ representation rights. Three indicators summarize the official treatment of the unemployed:
benefit duration, active labour market policies and the benefit replacement ratio. The process of wage
bargaining is characterised by five indicators: union co-ordination, employer co-ordination, the union
coverage index, union density and the decentralisation ranking of wage bargaining. Decentralisation
refers to the level at which bargaining occurs: plant, firm, industry, economy. In addition, Nickell and
Layard distinguish payroll taxes from the total tax wedge. The latter gives a crude measure of the
wedge between real labour costs and real take-home pay. Another indicator is the proportion of
households living in owner-occupied accomodation, which represents a possible proxy for the barriers
to regional mobility, as suggested by Oswald (1996). Nickell and Layard also present a measure of the
real interest rate, which may be related to the extent of pressure on prices and also to wage pressure
insofar as non-labour income is increasing in the real interest rate. Finally, Nickell and Layard
introduce the average change in inflation to capture long-term variations across countries in the stance
of macroeconomic policy.
The regression results of Nickell and Layard show that labour market indicators that conventi-
onally come under the heading of direct rigidities (employment protection and labour standards) have
no observable impact on unemployment. There is also no significant effect of the degree of decentrali-
zation of wage bargaining on unemployment. Nickell and Layard (1997) therefore conclude that "..the
key labour market institutions on which policy should be focussed are unions and social security
systems. Encouraging product market competition is a key policy to eliminate the negative effect of
unions. Minimising the adverse incentive effects is the important issue for social security. By
comparison, spending time worrying about strict labour market regulations, employment protection
and minimum wages is probably time simply wasted". Interestingly, the conclusion that "Encouraging
product market competition is a key policy to eliminate the negative effect of unions" does not stem
from their empirical investigations (Nickell and Layard did not introduce a variable measuring product
market competition). This suggestion, however, is in line with the theoretical model as developed in
Nickell (1998). The model predicts that the rate of unemployment and the autonomous factors
affecting wages and prices are related over the long term.
Nickell and Layard (1997) also present some regressions relating growth rates of labour
productivity to labour market indicators. It appears that many indicators are insignificant. The only
clear-cut results are the positive impact of employment protection and the negative effect of the total
tax wedge. But both of these are completely wiped out once convergence is controlled for, using the
initial productivity gap between the country concerned and the United States. So their main finding is
that labour market institutions appear to have a weak association with productivity growth.- 5 -
2.3 Other Indicators
The core of the dataset consists of indicators from the World Competitiveness Yearbook, and labour
market indicators from Nickell and Layard. This set is supplemented by detailed data on active labour
market policies from Martin (1998), data on the share of labour force aged 45 and over, and total R&D
scientists and engineers of university graduates per 100 of labour force from the OECD Jobs Study
(1994), productivity measures in service industries from Pilat (1996), educational indicators from Lee
and Barro (1997), and indicators concerning business risks from Knack and Keefer (1995).
3 Clustering
3.1 Analysis
Institutions are very difficult to measure, but there are a large number of indicators available, which
measure institutions in an indirect way. In this paper we use a form of cluster analysis to discover
relationships between individual indicators, resulting in new (latent) variables which we try to interpret
as "real" institutions. We use the term cluster analysis for a procedure, based on the concept of
principal components, that creates new variables, which we call clusters (cf. Jackson, 1991). In the
procedure we follow there is a trade-off between two objectives: independence and interpretation. The
clusters should be independent from each other, so that they can be used as independent variables in
regression analysis. In addition, the clusters should be created in such a way that every original
indicator can be assigned to exactly one cluster. By construction, principal components are
independent, but every principal component is created as a linear combination of every original
indicator, violating the second objective of easy interpretation. We apply Oblique Principal Component
Cluster Analysis (OPCCA). This procedure first computes principal components and then transforms
these principal components to obtain new variables (clusters), which are easier to interpret, because
every original indicator gets a nonzero weight in just one cluster (cf. Jolliffe, 1986). This method
therefore lays more emphasis on the second objective stated above. Furthermore, applying this method
typically yields fewer clusters than there are indicators, thereby reducing the number of variables
(institutions).
Applying the OPCCA clustering method on our set of 101 indicators yields a total of 19
clusters. In section 3.2, of each cluster, we list the constituent indicators (detailed descriptions can be
found in the Data Appendix), the signs of the associated factor loadings and the (1-R ) ratios. The (1-
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R ) ratio of an indicator is defined as one minus the squared ratio of the correlation between that
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indicator and its own cluster and the maximum correlation between that indicator and any other cluster.
If an indicator is closely correlated with more than one cluster, this ratio is close to 1, and if it is typical
of only one cluster, this ratio is close to 0. An example is the indicator WORKERMO ("Employees
truly identify with company objectives") in cluster 12. The R-squared of this indicator with cluster 12- 6 -
is high (0.91) and the R-squared with the next closest cluster is low (0.51). So the (1-R ) ratio is very
2
low: 0.19 (=0.09/0.49).
Furthermore, we report the Proportion of Variation Explained by each cluster and the Second
Eigenvalue. The Proportion Explained by a cluster is the variance of the newly created cluster variable
divided by the sum of the variances of its constituent indicator variables. A cluster having a high
Second Eigenvalue suggests that there might be two different structures within that cluster. Our
procedure splits a cluster when the Second Eigenvalue is larger than 1. In section 3.3 we will elaborate
on this criterion.
3.2 Results
In naming these clusters, one should of course try to take as many constituent indicators into account
as possible. For most of the clusters this is possible, but some of them are not so easy to interpret.
Where interpretation of a cluster is less straightforward (which we indicate with an asterisk), we base
our name mainly on the indicators with the lowest (1-R ) ratio, i.e, the indicators that are most typical
2
for that cluster.
C1: Social Infrastructure (Explained 71%, Second Eigenvalue 0.62)
INTERDIS (+) 0.88, INTERLPRO (+) 0.67, NATIRISK (+) 0.55, STRATALL (+) 0.77, BURDELAY
(+) 0.44, COMTRANS (+) 0.49, COSTOCAP (+) 0.50, CONTENFO (+) 0.50, INFLA (+) 0.69
The first cluster can easily be interpreted as Social Infrastructure. The main indicators in this cluster
are the four variables we have obtained from the BERI dataset, which have all grouped together in this
cluster. Switzerland, Germany, the USA, the Netherlands and Japan rank at the top of this cluster,
whereas the Latin European countries, Australia and France rank at the bottom.
C2: Employer Orientation  (Explained 61%, Second Eigenvalue 0.88)
*
RRATE (+) 0.63, CAPITALT (-) 0.77, EMCORD (+) 0.45, PLIABILI (+) 0.74, FORLANGS (+) 0.21,
EDSYSTEM (+) 0.70
We interpret cluster 2 as Employer Orientation. An important indicator in this cluster is the degree of
employer coordination in wage bargaining, which is positively correlated with the benefit replacement
ratio and the extent foreign languages are taught at compulsory schools. This cluster tells us something
about the role employers play in society as a whole in relation to the educational system and the
welfare system. Employer Orientation is high in the Scandinavian countries and Austria and low in
the US, the UK, Italy, Australia and Spain.- 7 -
C3: Business Practices (Explained 77%, Second Eigenvalue 0.60)
BURCRACY (+) 0.44, IMPROPER (+) 0.42, TELECOMM (+) 0.36, DELEGATE (+) 0.45, COM-
PUTER (+) 0.72, POSTINGS (+) 0.65, NEWINFOT (+) 0.45, COBOARDS (+) 0.52
The third cluster relates to the environment in which businesses can oparate as well as the practices
within these businesses. Information and communication technology plays an important role in
Business Practices. New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries rank high, while the Latin European
countries, Japan and France rank low.
C4: Long-Term Emphasis (Explained 60%, Second Eigenvalue 0.97)
PROTECTI (-) 0.80, TOTALRES (+) 0.77, SCHDAY (+) 0.67, ECOFLEXI (+) 0.31, LONGOBJE (+)
0.52, MARKETIN (+) 0.62, NATCULTR (-) 0.54, OVER45 (+) 0.49
Most of the indicators in this cluster contain information about the Long-Term Emphasis of the
economy. Negative signs of PROTECTI ("National protectionism does not prevent foreign products
and services from being imported") and NATCULTR ("National culture is open towards foreign cul-
tures") imply that the long-term emphasis of a country is negatively correlated with the economic and
cultural openness of that country towards other countries. Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden and
Austria rank high, whereas Portugal, Ireland, New Zealand, Belgium and Australia rank low.
C5: Labour Immobility  (Explained 49%, Second eigenvalue 0.87)
*
HOME (+) 0.50, MARKETDO (-) 0.70, SHPUPS (-) 0.80, INDUSDIS (+) 0.47, DISTRITE (-) 0.76,
ARABLEAR (+) 0.69
High home ownership, a large arable area per capita and a low productivity in the transport sector point
to a low population density. An important economic aspect of this is Labour Immobility. This does
however not relate to the other three indicators in this cluster. This cluster explains only 49% of
variation, underlining its heterogeneity. Labour Immobility is high in Australia, Finland, Spain, Norway
and Canada and low in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Belgium.
C6: Labour Market Flexibility (Explained 76%, Second Eigenvalue 0.48)
UNION (-) 0.54, LSTAND (-) 0.40, EMPRO (-) 0.35, HIRINGFI (+) 0.35, NONWAGES (+) 0.42,
FREEMANA (+) 0.46
With a high amount of variation explained and a low second eigenvalue, this cluster represents all its- 8 -
        The indicators ENTREPRE and ENTINNOV refer to the same question ("Managers generally have a good sense
1
of entrepreneurship and innovation") from WCY in 1994 and 1996.
six constituent indicators very well. Labour Market Flexibility is high in the Anglo-Saxon countries
and Switzerland and low in the Latin European countries, France and Sweden.
C7: Entrepreneurship (Explained 64%, Second Eigenvalue 1.00)
ENTREPRE (+) 0.60, PARALLEL (+) 0.40, RESTRUCT (+) 0.53, MARKETTI (+) 0.57, ENTINNOV
(+) 0.42.
Although this cluster seems to be quite coherent, a second eigenvalue of 1.00 indicates that it is right
on the edge of being split into two parts: ENTREPRE, ENTINNOV and MARKETTI on the one hand
and PARALLEL and RESTRUCT on the other hand . (This splitting can be obtained by simply
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lowering the maximum second eigenvalue allowed to slightly below 1.00; see section 2.4). The first
group is indicative of the emphasis on innovation, while the second represents a more general attitude
of businesess towards economic change. Entrepreurship is high in New Zealand, the US, Denmark,
the Netherlands and Ireland, and low in Portugal, Germany, Spain, Japan and Australia.
C8: Government Priorities  (Explained 64%, Second Eigenvalue 0.58)
*
HOURS (+) 0.51, COMPPRIC (+) 0.60, SHPUPP (-) 0.46, GOVECPRT (+) 0.48
This eighth cluster says something about Government Priorities: it distinguishes between governments
that are more concerned with competititive economic policies and governments that lay more emphasis
on redistribution of wealth. Japan, Portugal, the US, Ireland and the UK rank high in this cluster,
whereas the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland rank low.
C9: Physical Infrastructure (Explained 66%, Second Eigenvalue 0.89)
ROADINFR (+) 0.55, AIRINFRA (+) 0.53, RAILINFR (+) 0.63, PORTACCE (+) 0.79, ACCESSIN
(+) 0.59, SOCIALRE (+) 0.68, BASICRES (+) 0.57, LIFEQUAL (+) 0.92, MAINLINS (+) 0.76
Cluster 9 quite clearly represents the Physical Infrastructure of a country, including communication
infrastructure. In addition, it contains the two social variables SOCIALRE ("Managers pay a lot of
attention to their responsibility towards society") and LIFEQUAL ("Quality of life in your country is
very adequate"), though the latter has a high (1-R ) ratio. The Scandinavian countries (Norway
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excluded), Switzerland and Germany rank high, and the Latin European countries, Ireland and the UK
rank low.- 9 -
C10: Openness to Immigration  (Explained 63%, Second Eigenvalue 0.69)
*
UDEN (+) 0.58, ALMPGDP (+) 0.48, XL (+) 0.76, IMMILAWS (+) 0.48, TELEREVP (-) 0.41
This cluster can be interpreted as a country’s Openness to Immigration, supported by a high amount
spent on active labour market policies and high union densities. Hence, it relates to the bottom end of
the labour market. The Scandinavian countries and Ireland rank high, whereas Switzerland, the US,
Japan, Spain and Austria rank low.
C11:  Competition Policies (Explained 66%, Second Eigenvalue 0.89)
BENEFIT (+) 0.88, TRADEPOL (+) 0.52, STATEINT (+) 0.46, STATECON (+) 0.50, PRICECON
(+) 0.45, LOBBYING (+) 0.54, ANTITRUS (+) 0.83
Nearly all indicators in this cluster relate to Competition Policies (and competition practices). New
Zealand, Germany, the UK, Sweden and Denmark rank at the top of this cluster, whereas the Latin
European countries, Japan and France rank at the bottom.
C12:  Labour Quality (Explained 77%, Second Eigenvalue 0.67)
INDUSREL (+) 0.45, COMLITER (+) 0.37, TOTQUALT (+) 0.37, NEWSPAPR (+) 0.51, LITER-
ACY (+) 0.45, WORKERMO (+) 0.19, VALUESSO (+) 0.76
Apart from VALUESSO ("Values of the society support competitiveness") this is a very homogeneous
cluster, which we interpret as Labour Quality. Not only does it contain indicators concerning the
quality of the workforce, but also their impact on industrial relations. Note that this is not a classic
human capital variable, since it contains no ’hard’ schooling data. Labour Quality is high in Japan, the
Scandinavian countries (Norway excluded) and Switzerland, and low in the Latin European countries,
France and the UK.
C13:  Tax Incentives  (Explained 66%, Second Eigenvalue 0.74)
*
NP12 (+) 0.41, TOPTAXES (-) 0.30, TAXPERSO (+) 0.62, AIRLINES (-) 0.51
We name this cluster Tax Incentives, because TOPTAXES (The top percentage marginal tax rate on
personal income) is negatively associated with TAXPERSO ("Personal taxes encourage individual
work initiative"). Tax Incentives are high in the Anglo-Saxon countries, in Portugal and Switzerland,
and low in Sweden, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium and Italy.- 10 -
C14:  Technology & Skills (Explained 72%, Second Eigenvalue 0.70)
TECHNOCO (+) 0.57, SKILLEDL (+) 0.49, MANAGERS (+) 0.47, ENGINEER (+) 0.55
This very homogeneous cluster represents the Technology & Skills of a particular country, including
managerial competence. Cluster 14 ranks from Japan, Germany and the Scandinavian countries
(Denmark excluded) at the top to the Latin European countries, the UK and New Zealand at the
bottom.
C15:  Labour Taxes (Explained 72%, Second Eigenvalue 0.67)
PGROW (-) 0.63, TL (+) 0.30, T (+) 0.18
In contrast to Tax Incentives represented by cluster 13, which lays emphasis on the marginal tax rate
on personal income, this cluster gives an indication of the level of Labour Taxes in a country. The
negative correlation of T and TL with PGROW (The growth rate of population of working age) shows
that this cluster also includes information about the tax burden in a country. Labour Taxes are high in
Sweden, Italy, France, Finland and Spain, and low in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and
Japan.
C16:  Openness to Investment (Explained 66%, Second Eigenvalue 0.74)
FORINVES (+) 0.28, VENTURES (+) 0.38, CORTAXES (-) 0.61
This cluster, which represents Openness to Investment, speaks for itself. It comes as no surprise that
FORINVES ("Foreign investors are free to acquire control in a domestic company") and VENTURES
("Cross border ventures can be negotiated freely") are negatively correlated with CORTAXES
(Corporate taxes as a percentage of GDP). Openness to Investment is high in Austria, Denmark,
Germany, Ireland and Finland, and low in Japan, Australia, France, Norway and Canada.
C17:  Union Orientation (Explained 82%, Second Eigenvalue 0.41)
UNCORD (-) 0.17, TEAPRI (+) 0.41, CENTRAL (+) 0.28
This cluster has the highest Proportion Explained. We name this cluster Union Orientation, because
it combines union co-ordination in wage bargaining with the level at which bargaining occurs: plant,
firm, industry or economy. Union Orientation is high in Switzerland, Ireland, the US, Canada and the
UK and low in the Scandinavian countries (Finland excluded), Austria and Belgium.- 11 -
C18:  Active Labour Market Policies (Explained 78%, Second Eigenvalue 0.43)
ALMPPE (+) 0.25, ALMPPU (+) 0.32
This small cluster spreak for itself. Active Labour Market Policies are strong in the Scandinavian
countries (Finland excluded), Portugal and Italy, and weak in Japan, Spain, Austria, the UK and
Canada.
C19:  Post-Modern Characteristic (Explained 74%, Second eigenvalue 0.52)
ERETIRE (+) 0.32, ENVIRONT (-) 0.31
This is an interesting result, although we cannot give this cluster a useful name. The early retirement
index is negatively correlated with ENVIRONT ("Existing laws to protect the environment are
compatible with the conduct of business"). The cluster tells us that countries with high non-
participation rates for males aged 55-64, like Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany,
generally have more stringent laws to protect the environment. Norway, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland
and Ireland rank low in this cluster.
3.3 Robustness
In this subsection we focus our attention on the robustness of the results of our clustering procedure.
We make a distinction between two types of robustness: the number of clusters and their composition
should not be affected a great deal by a change in either (1) the stopping criterion we use in our
clustering procedure (procedural robustness) or (2) the addition or deletion of a small number of
indicators (input robustness).
Let us first look into procedural robustness. There are a number of parameters that influence
the OPCCA procedure. The most important of these parameters is the stopping criterion. In our
analysis, we stop the splitting of clusters when the second eigenvalue of each cluster that contains two
indicators or more is less than one (which we will call our basic procedure). The effect of a lowering
of this boundary to for example 0.95 is not as obvious as it seems. Not only will clusters 4 and 7
(which have a second eigenvalue between 0.95 and 1.00) be split, but during the third stage of the iter-
ation indicators belonging to other clusters may be reassigned as well.
Performing OPCCA with this stopping criterion of a maximum second eigenvalue of 0.95
yields roughly the same clusters as our basic procedure. Cluster 4 splits into PROTECTI, SCHDAY,
LONGOBJ, NATCULTR and OVER45 on the one hand and TOTALRES, ECOFLEXI and
MARKETIN on the other hand. Cluster 7 splits into ENTREPRE, MARKETTI and ENTINNOV
versus PARALLEL and RESTRUCT. In addition, INTERDIS goes from cluster 1 to 9, STRATALL
from 1 to 5, PLIABILI from 2 to 8 and LIFEQUAL from 9 to 8. All other clusters remain the same.- 12 -
Stopping the splitting procedure earlier, at a maximum second eigenvalue of 1.05, yields 17
clusters in total. Clusters 8 (Government Priorities) and 18 (Active Labour Market Policies) in our
basic procedure come from a single cluster with a second eigenvalue of 1.02 and clusters 16 and 19
come from a cluster with a second eigenvalue of 1.002. The other clusters remain the same, so in the
last two iterations in our basic procedure, no indicator has been reassigned during the third stage of
these iterations.
Although there is no ’hard’ statistical reason why we should choose 1.00 as a boundary between
large and small second eigenvalues, this choice is customary in all sorts of analyses based on principal
components. We have shown that slight variations in this boundary do not have a large impact on the
final cluster structure. It is important to note that in the two alternatives stated above, there are some
slight changes in the interpretation of the affected clusters, but these are minor.
Basing the end of the iteration on the proportion of variation explained instead of the second
eigenvalue also yields similar results. In our basic procedure the least variation is explained by cluster
5, which accounts for 49%. Imposing 60% of variation explained results in 20 clusters, which are quite
different from the clusters we have got in our basic procedure. The reason for this is the presence of
one very large cluster containing 21 indicators ’pulling away’ some key indicators from other clusters.
This cluster has a second eigenvalue of 1.38 and does therefore not survive in our basic procedure.
Setting a higher barrier of 67% will split this large cluster and yields 30 clusters in total, most of them
containing three indicators or less. Most of the clusters in our basic procedure reappear in this result,
although some of them have been fractured.
From experience we know that OPCCA is robust with respect to its inputs. We have
constructed our data set of 101 indicators in a number of steps and after each step we have performed
our cluster analysis. Most notably, the clusters representing Social Infrastructure, Physical Infrastruc-
ture,  Business Practices, Labour Market Flexibility and Labour Taxes have remained roughly
unaffected throughout our research.
The cluster variables created using the OPCCA method are typically not uncorrelated. In fact,
some of the correlations between various clusters are quite high. Most of these correlations have the
expected sign. Social Infrastructure (C1) for example has a strong positive correlation with Business
Practices (C3), Labour Market Flexibility (C6), Physical Infrastructure (C9), Competition Policies
(C11), Labour Quality (C12) and Technology and Skills (C14), whilst the latter is positively correlated
with C3, C9 and C12. Another example is Labour Market Flexibility (C6), which is positively
correlated with Tax Incentives (C13) and negatively with Labour Taxes (C15).- 13 -
4 Classification of the countries
Overall, the results of our cluster analysis reveal that we can distinguish between 4 groups of countries:
1.  The Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden)
2.  The Latin European countries (Italy, Portugal and Spain)
3.  The Continental European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands
and Switzerland)
4.  The Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, UK, USA and New Zealand).
It is hard to find a place for Japan in these groups. In addition, in some clusters, France, Belgium,
Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland are outliers in this grouping. To illustrate this, we have plotted
Labour Quality (C12) versus Labour Market Flexibility (C6). Figure 1 clearly reveals the grouping and
the exceptions to the rule.
Figure 1 Labour Quality versus Labour Market Flexibility
The cross-country variation in labour market flexibility is larger than in labour quality. The Anglo-
Saxon countries combine flexible labour markets with an average degree of labour quality, whereas
the Latin European countries have inflexible labour markets and low labour quality.
Our classicifaction of countries is in accordance with existing classifications based on other
data sets, such as the cultural dimensions of Hofstede (1980) and social capital of Knack and Keefer
(1997).
Hofstede distinguishes 4 cultural dimensions. Power Distance, which defines the extent to
which the less powerful persons in a society accept inequality in power and consider it as normal.
Individualism, which opposes Collectivism (in an anthropological sense). Individualist cultures assume
that any person looks primarily after his/her own interest and the interest of his/her immediate family.
Masculinity, which opposes Femininity. Masculine cultures strive for maximum distinction between
what men are expected to do and what women are expected to do. Uncertainty Avoidance, which
defines the extent to which people within a culture are made nervous by uncertain situations.
Knack and Keefer distinguish Trust, which is the percentage of respondents in each nation
replying "most people can be trusted". Civic, which measures the strength of norms of civic
cooperation.  Putnam groups, which approximates the density of horizontal networks in a society (relig-
ious organizations, education, arts, music, or cultural activities, youth work), and Olson groups with
redistributive goals (trade unions, political parties, professional associations).
Table 1 Business Practices, Trust and Uncertainty Avoindance
To illustrate the simularities between our clusters and the data of Hofstede and Knack and Keefer,- 14 -
        GDP has been converted to US$ at 1993 EKS PPPs.
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Table 1 compares our Business Practices with Trust and Uncertainty Avoidance. In general, high Trust
societies like the Scandinavian countries are characterized by high Business Practices and low
Uncertainty Avoidance. The opposite holds for the Latin European countries (including Belgium and
France). It is clear that the Anglo-Saxon countries, supplemented by Switzerland and the Netherlands,
hold a middle position.
5 Economic Success
5.1 Productivity and Unemployment
In this section we relate our clusters to the economic performance of nations measured by two
variables: GDP per hour worked and structural unemployment.
Table 2  GDP per Hour Worked and GDP per Capita both as a % of USA
GDP per hour worked comes from Van Ark and McGuckin (1999). Table 2 presents these figures as
a percentage of US. Van Ark and McGuckin make a distinction between GDP per hour worked, GDP
per person employed and GDP per head of population . GDP per hour worked is calculated on the
2
basis of actual hours worked per year. To give an example: in 1997 Belgium has the highest
productivity both in terms of hours worked (107) and in terms of persons employed (104). However,
labour force participation is relatively low in Belgium, so that GDP per capita amounts to only 79%
of the US level. The differences between the two measures of labour productivity are substantial. In
nearly all countries, GDP per hour worked is much higher than GDP per capita. The exceptions are
Denmark and Switzerland, where labour force participation is relatively high and Japan and New
Zealand, where the effect of working hours is positive. Obviously, the best measure for productivity
is GDP per hour worked.
In terms of GDP per capita the US still is the leading country. In terms of GDP per hour
worked, however, 4 countries (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Norway) have exceeded the US
productivity level in 1997. Between 1990 and 1997 most countries increased their productivity levels
relative to the US. The fastest growing country is Ireland. The exceptions are Austria and Switzerland,
which are lagging behind US productivity growth. It is striking that the Japanese productivity level is
relatively low compared with most European countries (including Ireland and Spain). The lowest
productivity levels are found in Portugal and New Zealand.
Table 3  Structural Unemployment as a % of Total Labour Force.- 15 -
        The correlation with the actual unemployment rates is strong.
3
        We find that unemployment is negatively associated with Labour Market Flexibility. This is in line with the
4
findings of Di Tella and MacCulloch (1998), who relate a time-series version of (only) one WCY indicator
(labour-cost flexibility) to unemployment. We also find that the correlation between unemployment and Union
Orientation is hump-shaped, with the Scandinavian countries on the left-hand side and the Anglo-Saxon countries
on the right-hand side. Union Orientation combines union co-ordination in wage bargaining with the level at
which bargaining occurs: plan, firm, industry or economy.
      In contrast to the WCY data, labour market indicators represent information on two periods (see Data Appendix).
5
The second measure of economic success is structural unemployment. The data in Table 3 come from
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), which are based on estimates of the non-accelerating wage
rate of unemployment (NAWRU) for the OECD Economic Outlook (1998) . The figures show that,
3
in the 1990s, the structural unemployment rate has increased in Finland, Sweden, Germany,
Switzerland, Italy, France, Belgium and Austria, remained fairly stable in Japan, Norway, Spain,
Portugal, the US and Canada, and decreased in Denmark, Australia, New Zealand, the UK, the
Netherlands and Ireland. The latter countries are the most successful.
We analyse the relation between institutions and economic success by using OLS. All
regressions are run on 40 observations (the observations in 1990 and 1997 for each of the 20 coun-
tries). The independent variables are the 19 clusters developed above, a constant term and a dummy
variable for the observations in 1997. We apply the Maximum R-square Improvement for Dependent
Variable Method to detect the association between clusters and endogenous variables. The main
finding is that the number of statistically significant clusters in a regression equation is restricted. The
Tables 4 and 5 report the first 4 equations generated by the stepping procedure.
Table 4  Regressions to Explain Log GDP per Hour Worked
Table 5  Regressions to Explain Log Structural Unemployment
It appears that all coefficients are highly significant. The signs of the coefficients are robust with
respect to the stepping procedure. Both productivity and unemployment can be explained to a high
extent by a limited number of clusters. Starting from the 4-cluster model the increase in the explained
variance in the next steps is rather small relative to the number of additional clusters, especially in the
case of structural unemployment . The 4-cluster model, therefore, gives a good impression of the
4
relation between institutions and economic success. The dummy for 1997 only appears in the
regressions for productivity and not in the regressions for unemployment. This is explained by the
tendencies described above: between 1990 and 1997, GDP per hour worked has increased in almost
all countries, whereas structural unemployment shows a more varied pattern. The implication is that
part of the time-variation in productivity is not explained by our regressions, whereas the time-variation
in structural unemployment is adequately captured by changes in (labour market) institutions .
5- 16 -
5.2 Discussion
In the existing literature on growth empirics, most authors relate individual indicators to productivity
(or the growth rate of productivity). In our regressions we use combinations of individual indicators
(clusters), so that it is not easy to compare our findings with the results of other growth regressions.
The exceptions are the (partial) study of Nickell and Layard (1997), which we took as a starting point
in collecting our data, and the study of Hall and Jones (1999), which relates productivity to differences
in social infrastructure across countries.
Our Social Infrastructure is an important institution to explain differences in productivity
across countries. This is in accordance with the main finding of Hall and Jones, who combine two
indexes to measure Social Infrastructure. The first is an index of government antidiversion policies
(GADP). Hall and Jones follow Knack and Keefer in using the average of five indicators from the
International Country Risk Guide. The GADP variable is an equal-weighted average of these five
indicators, each of which has higher values for governments with more effective policies for supporting
production. The second index captures the extent to which a country is open to international trade
according to several objective criteria.
Social Infrastructure contains 4 of the 5 indicators used by Hall and Jones. In addition, this
cluster contains the answers to the WCY questions "Access to international distribution is well
organized" and "Strategic alliances are common between domestic and foreign firms". Our measure
of Social Infrastructure is therefore strongly related to the measure of Hall and Jones, although we do
not use openness to international trade according to objective criteria. Social Infrastructure also
contains the opinion of executives on: "Cost of capital does not hinder competitive business develop-
ment", and "Intellectual property is adequately protected in your country".
Figure 2 Productivity versus Technology and Skills
There are only 2 clusters which show up in both equations: Technology and Skills and Labour Quality.
Technology and Skills contributes most to the variation in output per hour worked. This supports the
hypotheses from endogenous growth theory that knowledge accumulation is more accurately modelled
as the desired outcome of entrepreneurial effort than as an accidental by-product of other activities.
Technology and Skills is a very homogeneous cluster. An important element of this cluster is the
number of R&D engineers relative to the labour force. Technology and Skills also contains the respons
to the WCY questions "Technological cooperation is common between companies", "Skilled labour
is easy to get", and "Competent managers are readily available". Figure 2 illustrates the positive
correlation between productivity and Technology and Skills. (To get a clear picture we did not plot
Portugal, which lags far behind Italy and Spain.) Technology and Skills ranks from Japan, Germany
and Sweden at the top to the Latin European countries at the bottom. Strikingly, the position of Great
Britain is among the latter group of countries. Figure 2 clearly reveals the exceptional position of
Japan, which has the highest level of Technology and Skills but is among the countries with the lowest- 17 -
level of productivity.
Labour Quality is negatively associated with productivity. The contribution of this cluster to
the Sum of Squares is relatively modest. Nevertheless, this cluster did already appear in the third step
of the regression (see Table 4), so that it can be seen an inextricable part of the final result. The
dominant indicator in this cluster is WCY executive’s opinion on "Employees truly identify with
company objectives", which is highly correlated with their opinion on "Total quality mangement is
comprehensively applied". The other indicators concern "Industrial relations between managers and
employees are productive", "Computer literacy is generally high among employees", "Economic
literacy is generally high among the population", and "Values of society support competitiveness".
Labour Quality also contains the number of daily newspaper circulation per 1000 inhabitants. We
prefer to call this cluster ’Labour Quality’ instead of ’Human Capital’, because no schooling indicators
are involved. Both unemployment and productivity are negatively associated with this cluster. A simple
mechanism might explain this. In countries with high Labour Quality wage push factors will be low,
so that demand for labour will be relatively high. This fosters the development of labour intensive
sectors and techniques, which depresses output per hour.
Figure 3 Unemployment versus Labour Quality
Labour Quality contributes a great lot to the variation in structural unemployment. As shown
in Figure 3, there is a negative correlation between unemployment and this cluster. There are some
remarkable outliers, however. Spain and Portugal at the left hand side of the picture have the same
Labour Quality, but they perform very differently in terms of unemployment rates. (The same holds
for Finland and Switzerland at the right side of the diagram.)
To explain unemployment, Active Labour Market Policies are very important. This result is
also found in other studies on OECD labour markets. Our dataset contains 3 indicators on labour
market policies. Interestingly, one of them, ALMPGDP (Spending on active labour market policies as
% of GDP), is part of Openness to Immigration, which is positively associated with unemployment.
Overall, apart from "union density" in Openness to Immigration and Active Labour Market Policies,
there is no role for labour market indicators in explaining unemployment.
6 Conclusion
This paper suggests a method for measuring institutions. We use Oblique Principal Component Cluster
Analysis to discover relationships between elements of institutions (individual indicators), resulting
in new (latent) variables which we try to interpret as "real" institutions. The method is applied to a
dataset consisting of more than 100 institutional indicators for 20 OECD countries, which are
potentially important to explain differences across these countries. We reduce this information to a
restricted number of clusters.- 18 -
After clustering, simple OLS regression is used to relate the clusters to GDP per hour worked
and structural unemployment. It appears that a restricted number of institutions can explain the cross-
country variance and the time-variance in productivity and unemployment to a high extent. No more
than 4 clusters explain 73% of the variance in productivity, whereas 4 clusters suffice to explain 87%
of the variance in unemployment.
There is a sound theoretical reason for believing that any factor which reduces (the growth rate
of) productivity tends to raise equilibrium unemployment (cf. Nickell and Layard, 1997). Our results
reveal that there are two institutions which simultaneously raise productivity and unemployment:
Technology and Skills and Labour Quality. Productivity and unemployment are positively associated
with Technology and Skills and negatively with Labour Quality, which indeed points at a trade-off
between our two measures of economic success. The simple explanation we have for this is that in
countries with a high degree of Labour Quality wage push factors will be moderate, so that demand
for labour will be relatively high. This fosters the development of labour intensive sectors and tech-
niques, which depresses productivity. It is possible, however, to mitigate this trade-off by a favourable
set of institutions. The examples are Norway, the Netherlands and the USA, where the level of
productivity is among the highest and the rate of unemployment is among the lowest.- 19 -
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Table 1 Business Practices, Trust and Uncertainty Avoidance
Business Trust Uncertainty Avoidance
Practices
NZL  129     49  Low
SWE  118  57  High   29  Low
DNK  114  56  High   23  Low
FIN   95  57  High   59  Low
NOR   69  61  High   50  Low
CAN   62  50  Middle   48  Low
AUS   60  48  Middle   51  Low
USA   58  45  Middle   46  Low
IRL   38  40  Middle   35  Low
CHE   33  43  Middle   58  Low
NLD   31  46  Middle   53  Low
GBR   13  44  Middle   35  Low
WGR  -15  30  Low   65  High
AUT  -35  32  Low   70  High
BEL  -57  30  Low   94  High
FRA  -61  25  Low   86  High
JPN  -93  41  Middle   92  High
ESP -167  35  Low   86  High
PRT -168  21  Low  104  High
ITA -224  26  Low   75  High- 22 -
Table 2 GDP per Hour Worked and GDP per Capita as a % of US
*
GDP per Hour GDP per
Worked Capita
1990 1997 1997
 1 Austria  87  85  78
 2 Belgium 100 107  79
 3 Denmark  71  77  81
 4 Finland  71  78  69
 5 France  99 103  75
 6 Germany (W)  91  99  75
 7 Ireland  77  91  74
 8 Italy  83  89  71
 9 Netherlands  98 101  75
10 Norway  92 106  95
11 Portugal  44  47  47
12 Spain  66  70  55
13 Sweden  74  78  69
14 Switzerland  90  79  87
15 UK  78  84  72
16 Canada  81  81  78
17 US 100 100 100
18 Japan  65  68  83
19 Australia  73  81  76
20 New Zealand  58  58  62
 Source: Van Ark and McGuckin, 1999
*- 23 -
Table 3 Structural Unemployment as a % of Total Labour Force
*
1990 1997
 1 Austria  4.9  5.4
 2 Belgium 11.0 11.6
 3 Denmark  9.2  8.6
 4 Finland  7.0 12.8
 5 France  9.3 10.2
 6 Germany (W)  6.9  9.6
 7 Ireland 14.6 11.0
 8 Italy  9.7 10.6
 9 Netherlands  7.0  5.5
10 Norway  4.2  4.5
11 Portugal  5.9  5.8
12 Spain 19.8 19.9
13 Sweden  3.2  6.7
14 Switzerland  1.3  3.0
15 UK  8.5  7.2
16 Canada  9.0  8.5
17 US  5.8  5.6
18 Japan  2.5  2.8
19 Australia  8.3  7.5
20 New Zealand  7.3  6.0
 Source: Elmeskow, Martin and Scarpetta, 1998
*- 24 -
Table 4 Regressions to Explain Log GDP per Hour Worked
*
N=1 N=2 N=3 N=4 N=4A
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE  0.10  0.09
(3.09) (3.13)
LABOUR QUALITY -0.09 -0.15 -0.15
(2.46) (3.94) (4.22)
TECHNOLOGY & SKILLS  0.12  0.15  0.21  0.19  0.19
(4.33) (5.74) (5.91) (5.76) (6.29)
POST-MODERN CHARACTERIS-  0.09  0.08  0.07  0.07
TIC (3.72) (3.26) (3.23) (3.24)
DUMMY 1997  0.10
(2.66)
Number of Observations 40 40 40 40 40
R  0.33  0.51  0.58  0.67  0.73
2
Ordinary Least Squares, t-values between parentheses. N is number of clusters. The constant term is 3.25 (N=1,2,3,4) and 3.20
*
(N=4A). (Mean productivity is 26)- 25 -
Table 5 Regressions to Explain Log Structural Unemployment
*
N=1 N=2 N=3 N=4
LONG-TERM EMPHASIS -0.34
(4.84)
OPENNESS TO IMMIGRATION  0.26  0.39  0.35
(4.29) (9.03) (9.73)
LABOUR QUALITY -0.33 -0.29 -0.46
(5.29) (7.42) (8.91)
TECHNOLOGY & SKILLS  0.22
(4.16)
ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES -0.32 -0.29
(7.35) (7.82)
Number of Observations 40 40 40 40
R  0.38  0.53  0.81  0.87
2
Ordinary Least Squares, t-values between parentheses. N is number of clusters. The constant term is 1.94 (in all regressions).
*
(Mean unemployment rate is 7%).- 26 -
        Logs are taken by the authors.
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Data Appendix
Our data set consists of 40 observations, two observations for each of the following 20 industrialized
countries: Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), West
Germany (WGR), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), The Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Portugal (PRT),
Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), United Kingdom (GBR), Canada (CAN), The
United States (USA), Japan (JPN), Australia (AUS) and New Zealand (NZL).
Economic succes is measured by two variables: GDP per hour worked (from Van Ark and
McGuckin, 1999) and structural unemployment (from Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta, 1998). The two
observations for each country represent two years: 1990 and 1997:
LNSTRUC  Log structural unemployment rate (1990, 1997)
LNPROD Log GDP per hour worked (1990, 1997).
The bulk of the indicators come from the World Competitiveness Yearbook (IMD 1985, 1991, 1994
and 1996) :
6
ACCESSIN  Access to international markets is well organized in your industry (1996)
AIRINFRA  Air transport infrastructure meets business requirements very well (1994)
ANTITRUS  Anti-trust laws do prevent unfair competition in your country (1994)
ARABLEAR  Log arable area (m /capita, 1996)
2
BASICRES  Basic research supports long-term economic and technological development (1996)
BURCRACY  Bureaucracy does not hinder business development (1994)
CAPITALT  Capital and property taxes revenues 1994 as a percentage of GDP (1996)
COBOARDS  Corporate boards are safeguards for proper practices in corporations (1996)
COMLITER  Computer literacy is generally high among employees (1994)
COMPPRIC  Competitive pricing. Domestic products rated by executives (1991)
COMPUTER  Log computer power per capita (1994)
CORTAXES  Corporate taxes on profits, income and capital gains as a percentage of GDP (1985,
1991)
COSTOCAP  Cost of capital in your country does not hinder competitive business development
(1994)
DELEGATE  Willingness to delegate authority to subordinates is generally high (1994)
EXOFLEXI  Effectiveness of the economy in shifting resources from new industries (1991)
EDSYSTEM  The educational system meets the needs of a competitive economy (1996)
ENTINNOV  Managers generally have a good sense of entrepreneurship and innovation (1996)
ENTREPRE  Managers generally have a good sense of entrepreneurship and innovation (1994)- 27 -
ENVIRONT  Existing laws to protect environment are compatible with the conduct of business
(1996)
FORINVES  Foreign investors are free to acquire control in a domestic company (1996)
FORLANGS  Foreign languages are taught extensively at compulsary schools (1994)
FREEMANA  Managerial freedom. Extent to which management is free to allocate corporate assets
as preferred (1991)
GOVECPRT  Government economic priorities. Extent to which government policies favor
investment and growth rather than distribution of wealth (1991)
HIRINGFI  Hiring and firing practices are flexible enough (1994)
IMMILAWS  Immigration laws do not prevent your company from employing foreign skills (1996)
IMPROPER  Improper practices do not prevail in the public sphere (1994)
INDUSDIS  Log industrial disputes, working days lost per 1000 inhabitants per year (1985, 1994)
INDUSREL  Industrial relations between managers and employees are generally productive (1994)
INTELPRO  Intellectual property  is adequately protected in your country (1994)
INTERDIS  Access to international distribution is well organized in your country (1994)
LIFEQUAL  Quality of life in your country is very adequate (1996)
LITERACY  Economic literacy is generally high among the population (1996)
LOBBYING  Lobbying by special interest groups does not distort government decision making
(1994)
LONGOBJE  Long-term objectives. Emphasis on the long term in strategic decision making (1991)
MANAGERS  Competent senior managers are readily available on the market (1996)
MARKETDO Market dominance by a few enterprises is rare in key industries (1994)
MARKETIN  Marketing orientation. Extent to which domestic companies are marketing oriented
compared to their international competitors (1991)
MARKETTI  Launching a new product into the market generally takes less time than in foreign
competitors (1996)
NATCULTR  National culture is open towards foreign cultures (1996)
NEWINFOT  New information technology meets business requirements very well (1996)
NEWSPAPR  Daily newspaper circulation per 1000 inhabitants (1996)
NONWAGES Non-wage incentives such as profit sharing and stock purchase plans are used
effectively to motivate employees (1994)
PARALLEL  Parellel economy enhances business development in your country (1996)
PLIABILI  Product liability as practiced in your country is appropriate for the purposes of
customer protection (1996)
PORTACCE  Port access infrastructure meets business requirements very well (1994)
POSTINGS  Overseas postings are readily accepted among managers in your country (1996)
PRICECON  Price controls of the government do not affect pricing of products in most industries
(1994)
PROTECTI  National protectionism does not prevent foreign products and services from being- 28 -
imported (1994)
ROADINFR  Roads infrastructure meets business requirements very well (1994)
RAILINFR  Railroads infrastructure meets business requirements very well (1994)
RESTRUCT  The domestic economy is well-adapted for long-term competitiveness (1996)
SKILLEDL  Skilled labour is easy to get in your country (1996)
SOCIALRE  Managers pay a lot of attention to their responsibility towards society (1996)
STATECON  State control of enterprises does not distort fair competition in your country (1994)
STATEINT  State interference in your country does not hinder the development of business (1994)
STRATALL  Strategic alliances are common between domestic and foreign firms (1994)
TAXPERSO  Personal taxes encourage individual work initiative (1996)
TECHNOCO  Technological cooperation is common between companies (1996)
TELECOMM Telecommunications infrastructure meets business requirements very well (1994)
TOPTAXES  Top percentage marginal tax rate on personal income, effective for most of 1990
(1991)
TOTALRES  Total expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP (1985, 1994)
TOTQUALT  Total quality management is comprehensively applied in your country (1996)
TRADEPOL  Trade policies in your country support international activities of your country in the
long term (1994)
VALUESSO  Values of the society support competitiveness (1996)
VENTURES  Cross border ventures can be negotiated freely (1996)
WORKERMO Employees truly identify with company objectives (1996)
Labour market indicators come from Nickell and Layard (1997). Each indicator represents information
on the periods 1983-88 and 1989-94 respectively.
Direct indicators of labour market rigidity are:
EMPRO Employment protection (0 = no regulation, 20 = strict regulation
LSTAND  Labour standards (0 = lax or no legislation, 10 = strict legislation)
The official treatment of the unemployed is summarized by:
BENEFIT  Benefit duarion (years, 4 = indefinite)
RRATE Benefit replacement ratio (% of income replaced by unemployment benefits)
The process of wage bargaining is characterized by:
CENTRAL  Centralization of wage bargaining (1 = most centralized)
EMCORD  Employer coordination in wage bargaining (1 = low, 2 = middle, 3 = high)- 29 -
        New Zealand estimated by imposing the same TL/T ratio (per period) as in Australia. 
7
        Italy: 1996.
8
UDEN  Union density (%)
UNCORD  Union coordination in wage bargaining (1 = low, 2 = middle , 3 - high)
UNION Union coverage index (1 = <25% of workers covered by collective agreements, 2 =
25-70%, 3 = >70%)
In addition Nickell and Layard introduce:
ERETIRE  Early retirement index (non-participation rate for males aged 55-64)
HOME  Percentage of households who are owner-occupiers
HOURS  Hours worked per year; work sharing
INFLA  Change in inflation rate (% points)
NP12 Proportion employed tenure < 2 years
PGROW  Growth rate of population of working age (%)
T  Payroll tax rate (%)
TL  Total tax wedge (%)
7
XL  Real interest rate (%)
Data on active labour market policies are from Martin (1998):
ALMPGDP  Spending on active labour market policies as % of GDP (1990, 1996)
ALMPPE  Share of expenditures on active measures in total public expenditure on labour market
measures (1985 , 1996)
8
ALMPPU  Spending on active labour market policies per person unemployed as percentage of
GDP per member of the labour force (1990, 1996)
From the OECD Jobs Study (1994) we have:
ENGINEER  Total R&D scientists and engineers of university graduates per 100 of labour force
(1991)
OVER45  Share of the labour force aged 45 and over (1990)
Some productivity measures in service industries from Pilat (1996):
AIRLINES  Airlines operating expense per available tonne kilometre (1993)
DISTRITE  Distribution GDP per person engaged (1990)- 30 -
        Lee and Barro give one data point per country, without the year of observation.
9
        The data for Austria are from 1992 and 1995 and the data for Finland from 1995 (for both periods). The data for
10
New Zealand are estimated by regressing each of the four variables separately on GADP, a composite constructed
by Hall and Jones (1996) and a constant.
MAINLINS  Telecommications mainlines per 100 inhibitants (1992)
TELEREVP  Telecommunications revenue per employee (1992)
Educational indicators are taken from Lee and Barro (1997):
SCHDAY  Number of school days at primary school
9
SHPUPP  Real government current educational expenditure per pupil at primary school as % of
real GDP (1985, 1990)
SHPUPS  Real government current educational expenditure per pupil at secundary school as %
of real GDP (1985, 1990)
TEAPRI  Pupil-teacher ratio at primary school (1985, 1990)
Some indicators concerning business risks are from the International Country Risk Guide (Knack and
Keefer, 1995) :
10
BURDELAY  Bureaucratic delay ( 1= long, 4 = short, 1980, 1990)
COMTRANS  Communication and transport quality (1 = low and 4 = high, 1980, 1990)
CONTENFO  Contract enforceability (1 = low and 4 = high, 1980, 1990)
NATIRISK  Nationalization risk (1 = high and 4 = low, 1980, 1990)- 31 -
List of Clusters
 C1:  Social Infrastructure (INTERDIS+, INTERLPRO+, NATIRISK+,
STRATALL+, BURDELAY+, COMTRANS+, COSTOCAP+, CONTENFO+, INFLA+)
 C2:  Employer Orientation (RRATE+, CAPITALT-, EMCORD+, PLIABILI+, FORLANGS+,
EDSYSTEM+)
 C3:  Business Practices (BURCRACY+, IMPROPER+, TELECOMM+, DELEGATE+,
COMPUTER+, POSTINGS+, NEWINFOT+, COBOARDS+)
 C4:  Long-Term Emphasis (PROTECTI-, TOTALRES+, SCHDAY+, ECOFLEXI+, LONGOBJE+,
MARKETIN+, NATCULTR-, OVER45+)
 C5:  Labour Immobility (HOME+, MARKETDO-, SHPUPS-, INDUSDIS+,
DISTRITE-, ARABLEAR+)
 C6:  Labour Market Flexibility (UNION-, LSTAND-, EMPRO-, HIRINGFI+,
NONWAGES+, FREEMANA+)
 C7:  Entrepreneurship (ENTREPRE+, PARALLEL+, RESTRUCT+,
MARKETTI+, ENTINNOV+)
 C8:  Government Priorities (HOURS+, COMPPRIC+, SHPUPP-,
GOVECPRT+)
 C9:  Physical Infrastructure (ROADINFR+, AIRINFRA+, RAILINFRA+, PORTACCE+,
ACCESSIN+, SOCIALRE+, BASICRES+, LIFEQUAL+, MAINLINS+)
C10:  Openness to Immigration (UDEN+, ALMPGDP+, XL+, IMMILAWS+, TELEREVP-)
C11:  Competition Policies (BENEFIT+, TRADEPOL+, STATEINT+,
STATECON+, PRICECON+, LOBBYING+, ANTITRUS+)
C12:  Labour Quality (INDUSREL+, COMLITER+, TOTQUALT+, NEWSPAPR+, LITERACY+,
WORKERMO+, VALUESSO+)
C13:  Tax Incentives (NP12+, TOPTAXES-, TAXPERSO+, AIRLINES-)
C14:  Technology and Skills (TECHNOCO+, SKILLEDL+, MANAGERS+,
ENGINEER+)
C15:  Labour Taxes (PGROW-, TL+, T+)
C16:  Openness to Investment (FORINVES+, VENTURES+, CORTAXES-)
C17:  Union Orientation (UNCORD-, TEAPRI+, CENTRAL+)
C18:  Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPPE+, ALMPPU+)



































































Figure 3 - Unemployment vs. Labour Quality